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Surreal je napisao/la: ↑

03 jun 2025, 20:08

Inter Milan are part of the biggest financial scandal in Italian football since Calciopoli. A confidential report reveals nearly €300m in revenues from fictitious Asian sponsors (2016–2019), allegedly used to bypass Financial Fair Play.

Je li ovo real deal, bi li mogla Roma uletiti u LP?

Ghost Sponsoring, COGIC, Mafia Links: Inter Milan at the heart of the biggest scandal since Calciopoli.

Immersed in the darkness of Inter Milan. The day after a crushing defeat against PSG, and as Simone Inzaghi prepares to leave the bench, a confidential report blacks up the picture even more. It highlights opaque financial management, dubious sponsors, worrying links with some ultrasound, and supposed institutional interventions. An explosive cocktail that could cause a whole system to falter and wake up the phantoms of Calciopoli.

After the fall on the ground, the abyss off the ground: Inter Milan is likely to go through the worst week in its recent history. Brutal humidity in the Champions League against PSG, the imminent departure of Simone Inzaghi, coach of a historical cycle, and now an explosive report that threw a chilling light on the club's finances: Inter Milan saw a black sequence. A confidential document, written by a financial adviser operating in the City of London, reveals financial management mechanisms that are considered irregular, worrying proximity to influence groups, and extensive institutional interference. Between fictitious sponsorships, creative accounting, and the FIGC’s supposed intervention to avoid exclusion from the championship, it is a whole system that seems to have allowed the nerazzurro club to remain at the top despite an economic reality that, according to the report, should have led it to liquidation, the exclusion of Serie A or even the demotion to lower divisions. This confidential report, written by a London banker – an adviser to a group interested in the acquisition of Inter Milan – sheds a stark light on the club’s financial practices during the first years of the Suning presidency (2016-2019). Published by the Italian website Affaritaliani.it, the document calls into question the strength and legitimacy of part of the income recorded at the time, in particular those linked to Asian sponsors.

Nearly EUR 300 million from China

Upon its arrival at the head of the club in 2016, the Chinese group Suning set up a network of "regional sponsors" that generated nearly 300 million euros in revenue over three seasons (2016-2019). A figure representing 27% of the total income of Inter over this period, according to the report. Of these, EUR 131.4 million would come from a Suning intra-group contract, and EUR 165.6 million from third-party partners, described as “doubt” by the author of the analysis. Revenues from these contracts, which are often temporary and difficult to trace, are presented as a lever to artificially support the club's accounts and to meet UEFA's requirements in the context of financial fair play. For the record, Inter was sanctioned by the European body in 2015 for non-compliance with economic rules, which led to a settlement agreement requiring a return to balance by 2019. Under Suning's presidency, the club's charges increased sharply. Player and staff costs increased from EUR 124 million in 2016 to EUR 192 million in 2019, and other operating costs jumped from 211 to over 310 million over the same period.

In this context, traditional revenues (TV rights, ticketing) are not sufficient to fill the gap. The only quick and significant room for manoeuvre is then found in commercial and sponsorship contracts, including those signed with Chinese companies. Partners include FullShare Holding (tourist sector), King Down Investment (online travel), iMedia (sports marketing), as well as a public limited company paying an entry fee of EUR 10 million and an annual contract of EUR 25 million to promote the Inter brand in Southeast Asia. According to the report, some of these companies have no clear links to football, and several have never published public financial information. Before Suning's arrival, Inter's basic income (excluding capital gains on transfers) was around 176-166 million euros per season. Three years later, the club saw its revenue increase by 46%, mainly thanks to these Asian partnerships, which brought in 297 million euros out of a total of 651.5 million euros. A spectacular increase, but marked by many grey areas on traceability, the real economic nature of the sponsors and their independence from the owner.

Rapid but questioned growth

Beyond the atypical income generated via Chinese sponsors, the analysis report evokes a broader set of structural dysfunctions around Inter Milan. It points to a precarious financial situation, questionable management practices, as well as alleged institutional interventions that would have helped to keep the club in operation despite an assessment deemed unsustainable. The document refers to a company with a negative capital, which, according to Italian standards, should have been the subject of a judicial liquidation procedure. This is based in particular on the gradual deterioration of the club's own funds and the levels of indebtedness considered incompatible with operating continuity. Artificial production of liquidity through "ghost sponsorships" and contracts without economic logic is denounced as a mechanism to circumvent the accounting standards and financial rules imposed by FIGC and UEFA. According to the report, pressure was brought to bear on COVISOC, the financial supervisory body for Italian professional football (the Italian equivalent of the DNCG in France), in order to prevent the exclusion of Inter from Serie A. A former member of this body reportedly denounced deliberate lack of control as a result of external interventions.

According to the documents, the FIGC has put in place ad hoc standards that would have favoured the Lumard club, in a context where other clubs have been sanctioned for similar or lesser acts. The report also raises lack of transparency regarding the final shareholders of the club, as well as control chains through offshore jurisdictions, including the Cayman Islands, which are on a blacklist. The situation was publicly commented on by the Minister of Sports, Andrea Abodi, who called for "full transparency, such as glass", directly linking the alleged breaches of the need to commit COVISOC. Part of the report focuses on Giuseppe Marotta, current Director-General of Inter. It is mentioned for direct negotiations with the club's ultra-supplies, especially during moments of crisis. Expressions such as "Marotta yields to pressure" or "resolution thanks to Marotta" are used to describe his mediation in internal tensions. The analysis draws a parallel with the period when Marotta was working on Juventus, mentioning regular meetings with figures related to organized crime, in private places, without this giving rise to official investigations. No judicial involvement is confirmed, but the recurrence of these contacts is noted.

The report notes a contrast between the public recognitions given to the club – such as the Ambrogino d’Oro by the Mayor of Milan Giuseppe Sala, or the victory of the Étoile – and ongoing investigations into links with certain ultraras groups. The timing of some public presentations, including that of lawyer Ignazio La Russa alongside the journalist Fabrizio Biasin, a few days after the outbreak of the ultras affair, is also highlighted as significant. Finally, President Steven is described as physically absent from key procedures, unable to travel due to the lack of a passport, which feeds into questions about the club's operational governance. What is reflected in the report goes far beyond an accounting irregularity. It outlines a system of financial, political, and institutional connivance that would have allowed an Italian football giant to deviate from the rules without assuming the consequences. If the facts are confirmed, it would simply be the biggest Italian football scandal since Calciopoli in 2006 and the Parmalat financial crash in 2003. The scale of the accusations, the supposed role of the FIGC and COVISOC, the nature of the income injected, offshore networks and political complacency could undermine not only Inter, but the integrity of the entire Italian football system.

Inter, the mysterious Chinese sponsors. The revenues from the Dragon "save" the accounts

The strange "regional sponsorship" contracts that have saved Inter from the grip of UEFA.Alongs an advisor's report for a consortium of potential buyers

The magic of Chinese sponsorships at Inter. In the week of the Superleague bubble, there is an analysis of a of the London that has been an advisor to a group of potential buyers of the Nerazzurri club and that ignites a beacon on the revenues of the company of the Suning group in the seasons 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19, contesting its validity. Report that Affaritaliani.it publishes and from which it emerges that from the first day in which it took control, the new Chinese property was able to generate a stream of one-tantum revenue “as regional sponsors” for the staggering amount of almost 300 million euros: 27% of the total revenues (including the capital gains from disposals in the transfer market), of which 131.4 million came directly from a contract.165,6 milioni da presunte “parti terze”. Fluxes that the advisor does not hesitate to call “of dubious nature”, profound anomalies that do not have a logical explanation. Unless, and this is one of the assumptions you can make, those sponsors and those “timed” millionaire contracts are served for a purpose. That is, to support the financial asset and bypass the grip of UEFA on financial fair play. The balance of the accounts necessary to be able to take the field.

It should not be forgotten that Inter (with Roma) had been sanctioned by UEFA in May 2015 for non-compliance with economic and financial parameters. From there, an agreement with the European organization itself, the so-called settlement agreement, to re-enter the parameters by 2019. When Inter took over in 2016, Suning knows that the team’s bogeyman looms over the team’s head under surveillance. It is therefore desperately necessary to increase revenues, as under its management costs continue to run.

Suning does not mind expenses in engagements and salaries. The costs of footballers and technicians fly. From 124 million in 2016 to 192 million in 2019. The rest of the operating costs also rose from 211 million in 2016 to over 310 million in 2019. The only way to calm down losses while complying with the agreement with UEFA is to increase revenues of the same extent, if not more so. Those of the TV rights are multi-year and more than that you can not let them rise, the receipts from competitions are in the budgets of football clubs the least important part.

There remain contracts as sponsors and commercial activities, the only area in which new **** of revenue can be found soon. Et voilà, here comes with Suning the famous contracts of "regional sponsorship" (Chinese). 87 million in 2017 and then another 100 million in the following years. This is the largest increase in total Inter revenues.

The budgets are clear. Excluding capital gains from the sale of players to other clubs in the transfer market, before the Suning era the Nerazzurri core revenues, in a rather flat trend, reach 176.1 million euros for the year ended at 30 June 2015 and 186 million in the following 12 months.

On June 28, 2016, Inter changed ownership: overall at the end of the following three financial years (as of 30 June 2017, 30 June 2018, 30 June 2019), the club managed to achieve “Chinese sponsorships” worth 297 million euros, giving a surprising growth in core revenues of 46% (297 million out of 651.5 million). However, a series of anomalies are to be noted.

The first: these are clubs that have little to do with football. The 10 million a year contract is with FullShare Holding a group that has hotels and tourism activities in South East Asia. Then there’s a contract with King Down Investment, better known as Donkey Mother, an online travel agency with the Ivma brand. Then there is the sports marketing company Beijing Advertising, better known as iMedia. And, finally, a non-specific Chinese company that ensures in addition to the entry fee of 10 million, an annual contract of 25 million to advertise the Inter brand in China, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia (see case the same country of origin of the previous property, Thohir, which does not plan to resort to the complex architecture of the "regional sponsorships" in the Asian area). Societies that the social heading will never be known about.

The second: the revenues from the “regional sponsorships” literally peep out of nowhere in the 2016-17 season (87 million against, at the same heading, the 351 thousand euros of the previous year in Thohir management) and then they seem Suddenly disappearing all together (between 30 June and 1 July) in mid-2019, at the time when the club scores a performance better and can count on some superstar players. Contracts “defined in approximate manner” and not found in similar practices by any of the other nobles team of the Old Continent, notes theadvisor, they are able to fruit Payment flows above nominal value Signed thanks to a Additional bonus system that they materialized during the execution of the same.

The third: each contract provides for a high entry fee, and despite this the regional sponsors, only 24 months later, do not seem to worry about being faced with a sudden termination of the contract (without the onset of lawsuits), having to give up the high initial investment (to be made to make money instead over time). At the end of 2019 these contracts were cancelled and Inter could not replace them, finding another buyer who took over the marketing of the same ("satiscalship" rights, the advisor defines them).

And so from the Chinese contracts come in just the right blow those 100 million a year that serve to keep the high cost increase at bay. The game is done. UEFA in May 2019 decrees an end to surveillance on the team’s accounts. Parameters respected thanks in fact only to those providential “Chinese sponsorship” contracts that Suning has managed to find in China. Everything is regular, it will be said, on the accounting level. It remains in the background that perfect timing. The magic of football. Affaritaliani.it asked for explanations on the document to Inter that did not respond.

DRHAUSE je napisao/la: ↑

03 jun 2025, 21:46

Surreal je napisao/la: ↑

03 jun 2025, 20:44

ocm kad Modrić prekuca ligu sa 40 godina

Javlja Di Marzio, ili ti ga najveći bombaš u sportskom novinarstvu Italije a možda i Europe.

Biscione je napisao/la: ↑

03 jun 2025, 22:10

A mi sve mislili kinezi ništa nisu htjeli ulagat a oni to radili tajno, kako nas vjera uči da treba, da bude veći sevap

Surreal je napisao/la: ↑

03 jun 2025, 22:25

Samo me čudi i ova apsolutna rasprodaja u Milanu, moraju to nadomjestiti odličnim igračima.

[Longo] AC Milan Milan will try to close the Samuele Ricci deal from Torino for €25M + €5M in bonuses once the transfer of Reijnders to Manchester City is formalized.

Biscione je napisao/la: ↑

04 jun 2025, 10:07

UrbyEmanuelson je napisao/la: ↑

04 jun 2025, 12:19

Ode najbolji veznjak lige. Pametno,u ovom Milanu bi samo stagnirao a igrac je za velike stvari.
Zalosno za Milan, al' drago mi je zbog njega.

Tritolone je napisao/la: ↑

04 jun 2025, 12:20

UrbyEmanuelson je napisao/la: ↑

04 jun 2025, 12:19

Ode najbolji veznjak lige. Pametno,u ovom Milanu bi samo stagnirao a igrac je za velike stvari.
Zalosno za Milan, al' drago mi je zbog njega.

Ode jedan, dolazi drugi koji ce biti najbolji veznjak u ligi

UrbyEmanuelson je napisao/la: ↑

04 jun 2025, 12:25

Ma istrosen je Modrić,ne kazem da nije klasa ali 40 je godina čovjeku.
To je jos jedan pokazatelj da liga ne napreduje,a ni Milan pogotovo. Još uvijek u Italiju dolaze igrači da privedu karijeru kraju.